Returns, Volatility and Liquidity on the ASX: Undisclosed vs. Disclosed Limit Orders by David E. Allen et al.
 
Returns, Volatility and Liquidity on the ASX: Undisclosed vs. 





1, Alexander S.-S. Cheng
2, Corale Comerton-Forde





1School of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Edith Cowan University 
2School of Economics and Commerce, University of Western Australia 






￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  ￿ ￿ ￿!￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿
February 2007 









David E. Allen 
School of Accounting, Finance and Economics 
Faculty of Business and Law 
Edith Cowan University  
Joondalup, WA 6027 
Australia 
Phone: +618 6304 5471 






This paper investigates the information content of the two types of limit orders on the 
Australian Stock Exchange ASX: undisclosed orders (ULOs) and limit orders. Given the 
large order quantity contained in ULOs, we attempt to examine the impact of ULO 
submissions, cancellations and executions on price changes and volatility over differing 
intervals within a day. Motivation is generated by the ASX decision to abolish the use of 
ULOs in favour of iceberg orders. Intraday analysis shows that the impact of both ULO 
and disclosed order submissions are no longer than one day. ULO buying/selling order 
submissions  at  the  best  bid/ask  price  increase/decrease  returns  and  price  volatility 
significantly more than disclosed orders. The cancellations of ULOs cause significantly 
larger price volatility than disclosed limit order cancellations. Compared with disclosed 
limit order submissions, there is an increase in liquidity from the significantly reduced 
spread upon DLO submissions.  
 
Keywords: Intraday effects; Returns volatility; Undisclosed limit orders. 
 1.  Introduction 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) regulations used to offer limit order traders the option to 
not reveal the quantity of an order with a value in excess of $200,000 (otherwise known as 
an  undisclosed  limit  order,  or  ULO).  A  regulation  intended  to  protect  large  liquidity 
suppliers  from  unnecessary  order  exposure  (Aitken,  Berkman  and  Mak,  2001).  By 
reducing the “free option” value of limit orders
1, the ASX potentially enhanced market 
liquidity. However, little is known about user characteristics of ULOs on the ASX. We 
examine,  what  additional  information  content  exists  within  an  ULO  as  opposed  to  an 
ordinary, disclosed limit order (DLO).  
  Our results are novel in a number of ways: we examine the usage of ULOs following 
three changes in regulations.
2  We also examine the usage of ULOs within a timeframe that 
precedes an assigned change in ULO regulation.
3  The sample adopted is of highly liquid 
stocks of the ASX/S&P 20 that constitute over 64% of Australian Stock Exchange market 
capitalisation (Standard&Poors 2005). The paper extends prior studies by examining the 
information content of ULOs submitted behind the best price, as well as the information 
content of cancelled ULOs. (See Aitken, Allen and Yang (2003) and Aitken, Berkman and 
Mak  (2001)).  It  further  examines  the  level  of  information  content  of  ULOs  against 
‘matched’ disclosed limit orders as well as ‘matched’ market orders.
4  
  Our analysis of intraday order data finds that both aggressive limit order submissions 
and cancellations are associated with short-term price impacts.
5 These price impacts are 
statistically  significant  for  both  disclosed  limit  orders  and  undisclosed  limit  orders 
measured at 1, 2, 5, and 10 minute intervals subsequent to order submission (cancellation). 
However, there is no evidence that ULO submissions/cancellations are significantly more 
informative than DLO submissions/cancellations. A direct comparison of the price reaction 
to ULO submission and market order submission is also performed. At no analysed time 
interval are market order submissions significantly more informative than aggressive ULO 
submissions.  
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
1 This concept is first described by Copeland and Galai (1983). 
2 Details of regulation changes are outlined in Section 2.  
3 The ASX’s Decision on Reforms document, “Enhancing Liquidity on the Australian Equities Market”, was 
published on the ASX website February 2005, available at: 
http://www.asx.com.au/investor/pdf/market_reforms_decision_paper.pdf.  
4 The Matching Strategy is outlined in Section 3. 
’￿Aggressive limit order submission is defined as an order submission that is at or better than the best price, 
but less that the opposing best price. Although these limit orders do not take liquidity immediately upon 
execution, they are positioned on the limit order book for potential traders that demand immediacy. Order 
data is grouped into three separate categories of orders.  ￿ (￿
  Proxies for volatility and liquidity are also examined surrounding ULO submission 
and cancellation. ULO submissions are not associated with greater volatility than disclosed 
limit  order  submissions  at  all  time  intervals.  There  is  a  significant  reduction  in  the 
proportional  bid-ask  spread  following  aggressive  ULO  submission.  This  reduction  in 
proportional  spread  is  greater  than  the  reduction  in  proportional  spread  following 
aggressive  disclosed  limit  order  (DLO)  submission.  This  difference  is  statistically 
significant at all measured time intervals.  
2.  Some prior literature 
It  has  long  been  understood  that  both  transparency,  and  liquidity,  are  important 
characteristics of a well functioning securities market. Greater transparency may enhance 
market liquidity by reducing the profit making opportunities for informed traders relative 
to  uninformed  traders  (Pagano  and  Roell,  1996),  yet  alternatively,  excess  transparency 
might lead to a reduction in liquidity, (see for example, Bloomfield and O' Hara, 1999). 
  Liquidity exists within order-driven markets through the placement of limit orders by 
liquidity  suppliers.  These  orders  are  exposed  to  the  market  to  attract  order  flow  from 
liquidity demanders, who place market orders. The level of order exposure risk held by 
these liquidity suppliers is directly related to the level of pre-trade transparency (D' Hondt, 
De  Winne  and  Francois-Heude,  2003).  Since  auction  markets  are  inherently  more 
transparent than dealer markets (Pagano and Roell 1996), the ex-ante exposure of limit 
orders raises three potential problems for liquidity suppliers. Firstly, order exposure can be 
harmful to liquidity suppliers if it reveals their trading motives, see (Easley and O’Hara, 
1987).  This  may  lead  to  other  market  participants  changing  their  trading  strategies, 
reducing the probability that the large limit order will execute. The large limit order trader 
must then place the limit order at a less favourable price to improve their probability of 
execution, or submit several smaller orders over time (Esser and Monch, 2004). Secondly, 
order exposure is harmful if it provides a valuable free trading option. The value of this 
option increases when the stock price is volatile, when the time between trades increases, 
when the order is aggressively priced, and when the limit order is of a large size (Copeland 
and  Galai,  1983).  Thirdly,  order  exposure  is  harmful  if  it  allows  for  profit  taking  by 
parasitic traders (Pardo and Pascual, 2004). So whilst the traditional perspective is that 
increasing transparency increases equality, and liquidity, total or excess transparency may 
harm the market by raising these costs of supplying liquidity. ￿ )￿
  Bloomfield  and  O’Hara  (1999)  investigate  the  role  of  transparency  and  find 
differential  effects  for  pre-trade  and  post-trade  transparency;  with  quote  transparency 
having no discernable effect on market performance.  Flood, Huisman and Koedijik (1999) 
find  a  clear  trade-off  between  liquidity  and  transparency,  and    Boehmer  et  al.  (2005) 
contrast with Madhavan, Porter and Weaver (2005) and Aitken, Berkman and Mak (2001). 
Handa  and  Schwartz  (1996)  suggest  that  “investors  want  three  things  from  markets: 
liquidity,  liquidity,  liquidity”,  yet  there  is  no  simple  relationship  between  pre-trade 
transparency and liquidity. With an open limit order book and the selective disclosure of 
broker identification, the ASX may  be considered to be  a  highly  pre-trade transparent 
market.
6 The ASX is motivated to encourage limit order submission through reducing the 
unnecessary overexposure of liquidity suppliers. The allowance of undisclosed limit orders 
(ULOs) by market regulators on the ASX reduces pre-trade transparency for potentially 
greater liquidity (Aitken, Berkman and Mak, 2001). They find that when the relative tick is 
small traders are more likely to use ULOs because the cost of front-running is lower.  
  There are two dominant paradigms that surround the usage of ULOs; the “traditional” 
perspective suggests that ULOs are used by large patient traders. These traders are assumed 
to be large uninformed traders who use ULOs as a defensive option within an otherwise 
transparent market. The  second perspective suggests that informed traders may exploit 
ULOs as a trading strategy. Biais, Hillion and Spatt, (1995) find that the state of the order 
book is an important factor that influences order submission.  Aitken, Berkman and Mak 
(2001) compare the price reaction to the submission of an ULO, to the submission of a 
“matching” disclosed limit order (DLO).
7 They find that the submission of limit orders 
measured  at  one  and  two  minutes  are  generally  not  associated  with  any  statistically 
significant price reaction.  
2.1  Regulation changes to undisclosed limit orders 
Three changes to ULO regulation have occurred over the last decade. On 24 October 1994, 
the ASX raised the minimum threshold for the usage of ULOs from $10,000 to $25,000, 
and on 16 October 1996, this threshold was increased further to $100,000. More recently n 
1 July 2001, the threshold rose to a level of $200,000.
8 Aitken, Berkman and Mak, (2001) 
examined the change in market liquidity following the two regulation changes in 1994 and 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
6 Further analysis of the ASX and SEATS is given in Section 4.1.   
7 This matching procedure will be discussed in more detail in Section 3. 
* Given these three changes to ULO regulation and pre-trade transparency within the ASX over the last 
decade, it is compelling to examine how remaining ULOs may are used under current regulations. ￿ +￿
1996. The 1994 regulation change resulted in lower on-market volume and significantly 
wider bid-ask spreads.  
2.2  International Evidence about hidden limit orders 
A considerable literature has raised awareness of the role that hidden limit orders (HLOs) 
have within electronic order-driven markets.
9 HLOs account for over 16% of the LOB on 
the Brussels Computer Aided Trading System (CATS) System (Degryse 1999); 14% of all 
orders submitted, and 45% of all depth on the  Paris Euro-Nouveau Marché (D' Hondt, 
Winne and Francois-Heude, 2001); around 12% of order executions on the Island ECN; 
22% of the inside depth of Nasdaq stocks under the Super SOES system (Tuttle, 2003); 
50% of the book depth (over the best five levels) on the Euronext (D’Hondt, Winne and 
Francois-Heude, 2003); and 6.54% of submitted volume on the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(Anand and Weaver, 2004).  
  The  main  distinguishing  feature  of  ASX  ULO  regulation  that  differs  from 
international HLO regulation is that of time priority. Generally, the hidden quantity within 
overseas systems sacrifices all time priority. This means, that to encourage order exposure, 
all disclosed orders at the same price as a HLO, will execute before the hidden quantity, 
and distinction makes ASX ULO regulation unique.  
3.   Description of the ASX and SEATS 
On 30 June 2005, the ASX was ranked eighth on the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI) global ranking index, with 1774 listed companies, and A$975 billon worth of 
domestic market capitalisation (ASX 2005). The average daily turnover was approximately 
A$3.18  billion,  with  around  87,500  trades  per  day.  However,  the  ASX  remains  quite 
concentrated with the ASX/S&P 20 constituting in excess of 64% of market capitalisation 
(Standard & Poors 2005). The ASX is an electronic pure order-driven market. Trading 
occurs continuously from around 10 am until 4 pm.
10 The market opens, and closes, with a 
call. The ASX is a centralised automated market that connects brokers through a series of 
interconnected  terminals.  The  limit  order  book  (LOB)  is  open  to  the  brokers  under  a 
system called the Stock Exchange Automated Trading System (SEATS). The full LOB is 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
9 For simplification, and to avoid confusion over terminology, all overseas hidden/undisclosed/iceberg orders 
will be called hidden limit orders (or HLOs). All undisclosed limit orders (or ULOs) will refer to domestic 
ASX regulation. 
10The ASX utilises a staggered opening to avoid ‘scooping’ (or gaming) strategies by brokers.  ￿ ’￿
displayed to both brokers and traders offering a high level of pre-trade transparency.
11 
Orders  are  matched  up  and  executed  according  to  strict  price  and  then  time  priority. 
SEATS  was  introduced  on  19  October  1987,  allowing  the  ASX  to  become  a  fully 
automated securities market. The SEATS system does not allocate any formal dealers or 
specialists. Although brokers may trade as principal under certain regulatory requirements 
(Aitken, Garvey and Swan, 1995), the Australian SEATS is primarily a client order-driven 
market.  Since  1995,  the  ASX  has  allowed  for  the  minimum  quantity  of  shares  to  be 
purchased or sold to be a single share and for the maximum quantity to be 999,000,000 
(ASX 2005). The open  LOB means that  number of shares to be  purchased or sold is 
displayed to the remaining market participants. However, like some other order driven 
markets, such as, the Paris Bourse and the Toronto Stock Exchange, the ASX provides 
traders with the option to hide the quantity of some limit orders. Until recently regulation 
allowed all limit orders with a value in excess of $200,000 the option of not revealing the 
quantity of the order on the LOB. The order type (bid or ask), and price of the order 
remains  on  the  LOB,  whilst  the  quantity  field  is  replaced  with  “/u”  to  represent  the 
undisclosed volume.
12 The ASX regulation of these undisclosed limit orders is unique. No 
minimum quantity is required to be revealed to the market, and the undisclosed limit order 
does not sacrifice price or time priority (as seen within international markets that use HLOs 
or iceberg orders). The  undisclosed  component  of the  order  executes first (it has time 
priority), such that the full quantity of the order will only revealed when its value drops 
below $200,000.    
  ULOs were to be discontinued in the March quarter 2006, in conjunction with the 
decommissioning of SEATS and introduction of the CLICK XT™ system
13 (ASX 2005).  
ULOs are to be replaced with the internationally recognised iceberg order type. Iceberg 
orders  contain  both  a  visible  and  hidden  component.  Iceberg  orders  do  not  require  a 
minimum hidden quantity, rather each order is (typically) required to display a minimum 
disclosed  volume.  All  disclosed  volume  at  the  same  price  is  executed  first  before  the 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
11 However, broker identification is only displayed to other brokers. In the December quarter 2005 the ASX is 
moving towards removing the pre-trade exposure of broker identification. Similarly to the ULOs, this 
regulation change attempts to trade-off pre-trade transparency to encourage potentially greater liquidity 
provision.      
12 For private investors it is probable that they do not have access to the quantity of all individual orders. 
However, private investors generally do have access to amalgamated order quantities on market depth 
screens. The undisclosed quantity is not included within these amalgamated quantities either. 
13 The existing SEATS is a robust and capable trading system with significant excess capacity and the 
CLICK™ system is currently used for derivatives trading, for instruments such as, equity options, index 
options, index futures, and commodity futures. However, the future CLICK XT™ system may provide 
efficiencies for the ASX by allowing participants access to all ASX products under the one system.  ￿￿￿ ,￿
hidden volume. Then unlike ULOs the presence of an iceberg order is not flagged on the 
open  LOB,  or  SEATS  Trader  Workstation.  The  ASX  is  also  looking  to  set  minimum 
visible value to around $10,000. ￿
4.  The data, research methods and hypotheses 
The sample period used runs between 2
nd January 2003 and 31
st  December 2004. This 
period gives an indication of the current usage of ULOs on the ASX given their regulation 
has been unchanged since 2001. This sample period permits an examination of whether the 
ASX’s concerns about ULOs is justified. The stocks examined include seventeen of the 
S&P/ASX 20.
14 
  We  focus  on  the  price  reaction  to  limit  order  submission  and  cancellation.  (See 
Walsh (1997) for discussion of why orders are better than trades for the measurement of 
information content). We analyse three separate categories of orders.  
1)  Aggressive limit order submissions.
15 Orders with a price, equal to, or better than the 
best same side price, and less than the best opposing price (i.e. order must not be a 
marketable limit order). 
2)  Less  aggressive  limit  order  submissions.  Orders  placed  behind  the  best  price, 
however within one or two ticks of the best price.  
)- ￿ Aggressive limit order cancellations.￿Orders cancelled whilst positioned equal to, or 
better than, the best same side price on the limit order book. 
￿ Many  previous  studies  ignore  the  role  of  limit  order  cancellations  (see  Cho  and 
Nelling (2000)). Coppejeans and Domowitz (2002) observe that the three key events that 
affect the state of the LOB include; trades, order submissions, and order cancellations. If an 
order submission can be taken as information event, so could an order cancellation. Three 
categories of orders are selected as potential candidates for intraday analysis. We only 
examines orders that are submitted (cancelled) between 10:30 am and 3:30 pm during 
normal trading. 
  This paper analyses a set of ULOs and matching disclosed limit orders (DLOs) using 
the following criteria: 1) the matching order must be within 10% of the volume of the 
ULO, 2) the matching order must be of the same type, either a buy or a sell order, and 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
14 See Table A1 for the full list of analysed stocks. News Corporation Inc. and News Corporation Inc. 
Preference shares experience a change of stock code, reverse stock split and movement out of the ASX/S&P 
20 index, and are removed from the sample. Westfield Holdings Ltd. (WSF) also changed to Westfield Group 
(WDC). Section One analysis examines intraday order for all seventeen listed stocks. Section Two analysis is 
restricted to six ASX-listed companies. 
15 This is the identical order type to that investigated by Aitken, Berkman and Mak (2001). ￿ %￿
status, either entered or cancelled, 3) the matching order must be placed within 20 trading 
days of the ULO, 4) the matching order must not be within 10 minutes before or after ULO 
submission/cancellation, 5) the bid-ask spread of the matched limit order must be within 
two  ticks  of  the  bid-ask  spread  of  the  ULO,  6)  the  position  in  the  order  book  of  the 
matched order must match the position of the ULO. A match is obtained once a DLO 
satisfies all of the above criteria. To avoid multiple matches from the proposed matching 
strategy the following process is adopted. The absolute deviation between the ULO and 
matching order is minimised for the following variables, listed according to preference:  1st  
Order size (or volume), 2nd The bid-ask spread: The spread is the primary, implicit cost of 
trading, and 3rd Price. To further limit the number of matching orders, such that each ULO 
has only one matching order, the variation of trading days is also taken into account. The 
study minimises the absolute variance in the number of trading days between the ULO and 
the matching order. This can be seen as a fourth preference criterion. Finally, with much of 
the intraday volatility already accounted for, by eliminating the first half-hour and last half-
hour of the trading day, variation in the time of the day is used for the fifth preference 
criteria. Based on these five ‘preference’ criteria, no order that met the requirements of the 
matching strategy is eliminated, and no ULO had multiple matches. This procedure is 
replicated  to  attain  matching  market  orders,  utilising  the  set  of  Category  1  orders 
previously described.  
  The main risk faced by informed limit order traders is the risk of non-execution 
(Anand and Weaver, 2004). However, uniquely on the ASX, an ULO does not sacrifice 
time  priority.  All  international  systems  have  regulations  that  specify  that  the  hidden 
component of a HLO/iceberg order looses all time priority, to disclosed volume at the 
same price. Thus, it is hypothesised that an informed limit order trader may prefer the use 
of an ULO, to an ordinary DLO. Given informed traders preference for lower transparency, 
a greater proportion of informed traders are presumed to utilise ULOs. Therefore, a greater 
price reaction is hypothesised for an ULO submission (cancellation) relative to that of an 
ordinary DLO.  
H1: The mean price reaction to the submission (cancellation) of an ULO is 




& ,￿.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿/012￿￿ *￿
The limit order submission (cancellation) is taken as the event, and the short-term price 
reaction is measured at 1, 2, 5, and 10 minutes, and day close, subsequent to the event. The 
hypothesis is employed for all three categories of ULOs (and matching DLOs). ULOs 
create uncertainty into the amount of depth on the market, and this causes “uncertainty in 
execution  timing”  (ASX  2005).  The  submission  of  an  ULO  is  expected  to  generate 
additional  uncertainty  into  the  general  level  of  prices  due  to  lower  level  of  pre-trade 
transparency. This price uncertainty following the placement of an ULO will lead to a 
greater variance in returns compared to the placement of a DLO.  
H2: The variance of price reaction following ULO submission is greater 
than the variance of price reaction following DLO submission. 
The traditional perspective is that informed traders must trade using market orders, and 
thus,  market  orders  must  contain  a  greater  level  of  information  content  (Rock,  1990). 
However, to minimise price impact, or to supply liquidity, informed traders may place limit 
orders under certain conditions, see Bloomfield and O’Hara (2005) and Kaniel and Liu 
(2004). To compare ULOs directly with the impact of market orders we test the following 
hypothesis.  
H3: The mean price reaction to the submission of an aggressive ULO is 
greater than the mean price reaction to the submission of a market order. 
Since the submission of an ULO reduces the level of pre-trade transparency on the LOB 
this may correspond to a reduction in the level of liquidity. The existence of additional 
information content within an ULO (see Hypothesis 1) may contribute to a reduction in 
liquidity, through higher levels of information asymmetry. There is evidence of this within 
order driven markets, see Brockman and Chung (1999) and Ahn, Cao and Hamao (2002). 
The cancellation (of an ULO) removes the part of the adverse selection cost induced by the 
submission of an ULO, as the trader no longer wishes to trade at that price. We use the 
proportional spread as a simple proxy for the change is liquidity.  
H4: The mean increase (decrease) in proportional spread following ULO 
submission (cancellation) is greater than the mean increase (decrease) in 
proportional spread following DLO submission (cancellation). 
To determine the price reaction we examine returns at 1, 2, 5, 10 minutes and at the day 
close following ULO/matching DLO, submission, or cancellation. The price reactions to 
limit orders are measured as the change in price of the opposing quote. For example, for a ￿ 3￿
buy limit order will be measured as the ask-ask log return, and for sells it is the bid-bid log 
return
17. Formally stated, 
  Return for a buy order: R Buy= ln (A t/A 0) 
  Return for a sell order: R Ask = ln (B t/B 0) 
where Ao (Bo) is the best ask (bid) at the time of the order submission/cancellation, and An 
(Bn) is the best ask (bid) at time t= 1, 2, 5, 10 minutes. Returns calculation for the day close 
is also calculated. This calculation is performed by taking the log of the daily closing price 
divided by the spread midpoint at the time of order submission/cancellation.    
  The returns of matching market orders are measured as the change in price of the 
same side quote. For example, for a buy market order returns will be measured as the log 
change in the best bid prices, and for a sell market order returns will be measured as the log 
change in the best ask prices. The two years of order data also provides a large set of 
matched ULOs/DLOs/market orders. This allows for the use of standard t-tests to compare 
the difference of mean returns for the different categories of paired or “matched” orders. A 
simple  F-statistic is  used to examine the  variance of means. This statistic will present 
evidence regarding ASX’s concerns over ULOs destabilising prices.  
  An additional concern to the ASX may be the affect that ULO submission has on 
liquidity. A simple proxy for liquidity is the bid-ask spread. Since this study examines a 
range of stocks, the proportional bid-ask spread is examined. This study  examines the 
direct  impact  of  order  submission  (cancellation)  on  proportional  bid-ask  spreads.  The 
proportional spread is calculated by dividing, the difference between the best ask and the 
best bid, by, one half of the sum of the best ask and the best bid. The percentage change in 
proportional spread is calculated from, 
  Percentage change in spread: %￿S = ln (Proportional Spread t/Proportional Spread 0)  
Again, t = 1, 2, 5, 10 minutes following order submission, and Proportional Spread 0 stands 




17 For example, for a buy limit order, returns will be calculated as ln(An/Ao). Where Ao is the best ask at the 
time of the order submission/cancellation, and An is the best ask at time n= 1, 2, 5, 10 minutes, day end.  ￿ & $ ￿
5. Results 
We examine matched orders for seventeen ASX-listed stocks
18 from between 2 January 
2003  and  31  December  2004.  The  intraday  market  reaction  to  each  matched  ULO  is 
compared to that of a matching DLO or market order.  
  Table 1 presents the results for the mean price reactions to matched sets of ULOs and 
DLOs. Analysis of each order category is given below. Panel A summarises the results for 
aggressively entered limit orders. Aggressive submission of DLOs and ULOs (Category 1 
orders) is associated with a statistically significant mean price reaction measured at 1, 2, 5, 
and 10 minutes subsequent to order submission. On average, the submission of aggressive 
buy limit order is associated with an increase in the best ask price, and on average, the 
submission of sell limit order is associated with a decrease in the best bid price. This 
finding is  an indication  of the short-term informativeness of the  LOB.  For  ULOs, the 
magnitude  of  the  price  reaction  increases  from  0.029%  at  1-minute  interval  following 
submission, through to 0.042% at 10-minutes following submission. The price reaction to 
DLOs  remains  stable  at  around  0.03%  between  the  1-minute  and  10-minute  interval. 
However, at no measured time interval (1, 2, 5, 10 minutes and day close) are the mean 
price reactions to ULOs greater in terms of statistical significance at the 5% level. Panel B 
shows the results of less aggressive limit orders which provide no evidence of significant 
price reactions. Neither DLO submissions, nor ULO submissions, are associated with a 
statistically significant price reaction at the 5% level of significance at any measured time 
interval. The results for aggressive limit order cancellations are shown in Panel C. These 
are also associated with statistically significant price reactions over each measured time 
interval (except for cancelled DLOs). This means that on average, cancelled buy limit 
orders are followed by a decrease in the best ask price, whilst cancelled sell limit orders are 
followed by an increase in the best bid price. A greater price reaction to a cancelled ULO, 
compared to that of a DLO is only statistically significant at the 1-minute interval.  The 
Variance  of  price  reaction  is  also  examined  in  Table  1  that  provides  F-statistics  that 
examine the ratio of variances of returns. Returns for all limit orders are calculated as the 
change in the best price on the opposing side of the order book. Thus, these statistics 
examine if the submission of an ULO leads to greater variation on the opposing side of the 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
18 See Table A1 for the full list of analysed stocks. ￿ & & ￿
order book.
19 It is hypothesised that the decrease in the level of pre-trade transparency 
following the submission of an ULO will generate greater price uncertainty that will lead to 
a greater variance of returns.  
Table 1: ULO-DLO mean percentage returns  
   1 min  2 min  5 min  10 min  Day Close 
Panel A: Aggressive orders entered (1776 orders) 
ULOs  0.029  0.034  0.039  0.042  0.007 
  (15.22*)  (14.98*)  (14.06*)  (10.65*)  (0.37) 
DLOs  0.028  0.030  0.031  0.033  0.005 
  (14.39*)  (13.42*)  (7.36*)  (6.94*)  (0.28) 
t-statistic  0.34  1.10  1.61  1.38  0.06 
F-statistic  0.95  1.00  0.44*  0.67*  1.00 
           
Panel B: Less Aggressive orders entered (825 orders) 
ULOs  0.002  0.004  0.005  0.001  0.015 
  (0.96)  (1.40)  (1.10)  (0.09)  (0.60) 
DLOs  -0.002  -0.003  0.009  0.002  -0.039 
  (0.83)  (0.97)  (1.89)  (0.36)  (1.59) 
t-statistic  1.26  1.64  -0.61  -0.20  1.54 
F-statistic  0.90  0.76*  0.91  0.89**  1.04 
           
Panel C: Aggressive order cancelled (539 orders) 
ULOs  -0.034  -0.045  -0.044  -0.058  -0.100 
  (8.77*)  (9.45*)  (7.59*)  (7.52*)  (3.02*) 
DLOs  -0.022  -0.040  -0.044  -0.056  -0.042 
  (6.21*)  (8.27*)  (7.27*)  (6.03*)  (1.45) 
t-statistic  2.28**  0.80  -0.02  0.14  1.31 
F-statistic  1.20*  0.99  0.91  0.68*  1.30* 
 
Table 1 examines the mean price reaction for all matched ULOs, between 2 January 2003 and 
31 December 2004. Each ULO is paired with a matching DLO. The matching and preference 
criterion  is  outlined  in  Section  6.11.  Values  in  the  parentheses  are  t-statistics  for  the  null 
hypothesis that the mean return is zero. The t-statistic at the bottom of each panel tests the null 
hypothesis that the mean price reaction to ULO submission (cancellation) is greater than the 
mean price reaction to DLO submission (cancellation). The F-statistic at the bottom of each 
panel tests the null that the variance of returns following ULO submission (cancellation) is 
greater  than  the  variance  of  returns  following  DLO  submission  (cancellation).  For  the  t-
statistics  and  F-statistics,  **  represents  significance  at  the  5%  level,  and  *  represents 
significance at the 1% level. All returns are expressed as percentages. All values are correct to 
2 decimal places. 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
19 This is also an ideal measure as it is thought that ULOs are potentially being misused by brokers. It is often 
suggested that brokers may use ULOs to create “an indication of buyer or seller pressure in order to support or 
achieve a desired price on the opposite side of the order book2￿￿ & (￿
  None of the ten F-statistics presented in Panels A and B, exhibit greater variance in 
returns following ULO submission compared to DLO submission. On the other hand, in 
three (four) of the ten cases the submission of a DLO leads to a significantly greater level 
of variance in returns measured at the 1% (5%) level of significance, a finding inconsistent 
with Hypothesis 2.￿
  Statistically  significant  F-statistics  are  also  found  for  the  cancellation  of  orders. 
Variance of returns following ULO cancellation are significantly higher (lower) than DLO 
returns measured at the 1 minute (10 minute, day close) following order cancellation. Since 
the cancellation of an ULO essentially leads to the removal of ex-ante opaqueness, it was 
to be expected that the variance of returns be equal following ULO/DLO cancellation. 
  The following analyses separate the bid and ask orders and the results are presented 
in Table 2. Panels A/B show the results of aggressively placed orders. The separation of 
buy and sell orders demonstrates that ULO buys are associated with significantly greater 
mean price reactions than DLO buys, measured at two and five minute intervals. By day 
close however, the difference in price reaction between ULOs and DLOs is negligible. 
There is no evidence that ULO sells are more informative than DLO sells. The calculation 
of returns at day close finds that limit order sells are associated with a significant negative 
price reaction, whilst buy limit order submissions are associated with negative returns. This 
day close pattern appears consistently throughout the study, across all order types.20 Buy 
orders appear willing to pay a premium during the normal trading day, as these orders 
experience a price reversal at the closing call. 
  ULOs do not lead to greater volatility on the opposing side of the order book. Again, 
F-statistics show that in only one of the ten occasions is the variance of returns following 
ULO  submission  greater  than  that  of  DLO  submission.  However,  in  five  of  the  ten 
occasions DLO returns display significantly greater variance of returns compared to an 
ULO. The ASX has concerns that ULOs are exploited by brokers to generate a perception 
of buying/selling pressure, leading to greater price uncertainty on the opposing side of the 
limit  order  book  (ASX  2005).  This  finding  provides  preliminary  evidence  against 
Hypothesis 2. We now evaluate Hypothesis 2 for Category 2 orders: the less aggressively 
entered orders shown in Panel C/D. Returns for both buy and sell ULOs are not statistically 
different from zero, or from DLO returns. It is therefore unlikely that these orders contain 
any information content relevant to the short-term movement of prices. Once again, in 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
20 This is consistent across both market orders and the three limit order categories. ￿ & )￿
none  of  the  ten  intervals  are  ULO  submissions  associated  with  a  significantly  greater 
variance in returns measured at the 1% level. Again, ULOs do not lead to greater volatility 
on the opposing side of the order book. ASX concerns that ULOs may be exploited by 
brokers, leading to greater price uncertainty on the opposing side of the limit order book, 
appear to be unwarranted. The results for aggressive cancelled orders are shown in Panels 
E/F.  The  cancelled  ULO  buys  are  associated  with  a  statistically  greater  price  impact 
measured at the 1, and 2 minute interval than DLO buys. This may be consistent with the 
additional information content found within Category 1 ULO buy orders. However, there is 
never any statistically different price impact for ULO/DLO cancelled sell orders. Thus, it is 
unlikely that the market perceives ULO sells to be any more informed than DLO sells.  
  The  analysis  into  the  information  content  of  ULO/DLOs  is  also  performed  by 
examining all ULOs with a value between $200,000 and $1,000,000. The exclusion of all 
ULOs with a value in excess of $1 million eliminates approximately one third of matched 
sample.  
Table 2: ULO-DLO mean percentage returns- Buy/Sell orders separated 
   1 min  2 min  5 min  10 min  Day Close 
Panel A: Aggressive buy orders entered (959 orders) 
ULOs  0.032  0.039  0.044  0.050  -0.037 
  (11.46*)  (11.94*)  (11.47*)  (9.21*)  (1.30) 
DLOs  0.026  0.029  0.032  0.037  -0.039 
  (10.24*)  (9.03*)  (7.46*)  (6.79*)  (1.40) 
t-statistic  1.57  2.22**  2.08**  1.78  0.07 
F-statistic  1.20*  1.04  0.80*  1.03  1.00 
         
Panel B: Aggressive sell orders entered (817 orders) 
ULOs  -0.025  -0.027  -0.032  -0.031  -0.058 
  (10.07*)  (9.04)  (8.22*)  (5.63*)  (2.48**) 
DLOs  -0.030  -0.031  -0.029  -0.029  -0.058 
  (10.10*)  (10.17*)  (3.83*)  (3.52*)  (2.47**) 
t-statistic  1.28  1.05  -0.40  -0.25  -0.01 
F-statistic  0.70*  0.93  0.27*  0.46*  1.00 
           
Panel C: Less aggressive buy orders entered (446 orders) 
ULOs  0.003  0.003  0.009  0.004  -0.022 
  (0.86)  (0.78)  (1.45)  (0.63)  (0.60) 
DLOs  -0.001  -0.005  0.005  -0.002  -0.076 
  (0.40)  (1.02)  (0.72)  (0.26)  (2.25**) ￿ & +￿
t-statistic  0.86  1.29  0.43  0.62  1.08 
F-statistic  0.78*  0.72*  0.80*  0.84**  1.18** 
           
Panel D: Less aggressive sell orders entered (379 orders) 
ULOs  -0.002  -0.005  0.000  0.004  -0.059 
  (0.49)  (1.23)  (0.04)  (0.53)  (1.81) 
DLOs  0.003  0.001  -0.013  -0.007  -0.005 
  (0.84)  (0.26)  (2.15**)  (0.83)  (0.15) 
t-statistic  -0.93  -1.02  1.46  0.97  -1.12 
F-statistic  1.09  0.81**  1.10  0.96  0.85 
           
Panel E: Aggressive buy orders cancelled (291 orders) 
ULOs  -0.032  -0.043  -0.041  -0.051  -0.185 
  (5.87*)  (6.32*)  (4.90*)  (4.53*)  (3.64*) 
DLOs  -0.014  -0.025  -0.031  -0.044  -0.061 
  (3.23*)  (5.01*)  (4.56*)  (3.36*)  (1.63) 
t-statistic  2.63*  2.11**  0.88  0.40  1.95 
F-statistic  1.62*  1.83*  1.47*  0.73*  1.82* 
           
Panel E: Aggressive sell orders cancelled  (248 orders) 
ULOs  0.037  0.047  0.048  0.065  0.001 
  (6.59*)  (7.19*)  (5.96*)  (6.45*)  (0.02) 
DLOs  0.032  0.057  0.059  0.070  0.020 
  (5.40*)  (6.58*)  (5.65*)  (5.39*)  (0.44) 
t-statistic  0.61  -0.86  -0.87  -0.26  -0.31 
F-statistic  0.90  0.58*  0.58*  0.61*  0.81** 
 
Table 2 examines the mean price reaction for all matched ULOs between 2 January 2003 and 
31 December 2004. Each ULO is paired with a matching DLO. The matching and preference 
criterion  is  outlined  in  Section  6.11.  Values  in  the  parentheses  are  t-values  for  the  null 
hypothesis that the mean return is zero. The t-statistic at the bottom of each panel tests the null 
hypothesis that the mean price reaction to ULO submission (cancellation) is greater than the 
mean price reaction to DLO submission (cancellation). The F-statistic at the bottom of each 
panel tests the null that the variance of returns following ULO submission (cancellation) is 
greater  than  the  variance  of  returns  following  DLO  submission  (cancellation).  For  the  t-
statistics  and  F-statistics,  **  represents  significance  at  the  5%  level,  and  *  represents 
significance at the 1% level. All returns are expressed as percentages. All values are correct to 
2 decimal places. 
 
  Table  3  examines  the  null  hypothesis  that  bid  limit  orders  are  associated  with  a 
statistically  greater  mean  price  impact,  than  ask  limit  orders.  Panel  A  displays  strong 
evidence that aggressive bid ULO submissions are indeed associated with a statistically 
significant greater price reaction than ULO ask submissions measured at 2, 5, and 10-￿ & ’￿
minute intervals. Table 3, Panel C also provides strong evidence that the cancellation of 
aggressive bid DLOs are associated with a statistically significant lower price reaction, 
than cancelled DLO asks, measured at 1, 2, 5 minute intervals.  
 
Table 3: Bid-Ask limit order asymmetry t-statistics 
   1 min  2 min  5 min  10 min  Day Close 
Panel A: Aggressive orders entered 
ULOs  1.85  2.87*  2.20**  2.45**  -2.59* 
DLOs  -1.02  -0.45  0.40  0.80  -2.65* 
 
Panel B: Less aggressive orders entered 
ULOs  0.94  1.43  1.02  0.03  0.74 
DLOs  -0.86  -0.93  1.98**  0.43  -1.45 
 
Panel C: Aggressive orders cancelled 
ULOs  -0.67  -0.41  -0.63  -0.94  2.83* 
DLOs  -2.51**  -3.13*  -2.26**  -1.38  0.70 
 
Table 3 presents t-statistics correct to 2 decimal places. t-statistics test the null hypothesis 
that the mean price reaction to bid limit order submission (cancellation) is greater than the 
mean price reaction to ask limit order submission (cancellation). ** represents significance 
at the 5% level, and * represents significance at the 1% level. 
 
  The price reaction to limit order submission is compared directly to the price reaction 
of market orders using a procedure identical to the matching strategy used for DLOs in 
hypothesis one. Each Category 1 ULO is paired with a matching market order. The results 
are presented in Table 4. Both market orders and aggressively placed ULOs demonstrate 
significant short-term price reactions (excluding day close returns). Market order returns 
are calculated by taking the same side change in the quote. This means that for market 
orders, on average, a buyer-initiated market order is associated with a subsequent increase 
in the best bid, and a seller-initiated market order is associated with a subsequent decrease 
in the best ask. However, at no measured time interval are the returns for ULOs statistically 
greater than the returns for market orders. 
  A  clear  pattern  also  arises  for  the  variance  of  returns.  Over  short-horizons,  the 
variance  of  market  order  returns  is  significantly  greater  than  that  of  ULOs.  This  is 
significant for all measured time intervals up to 10 minutes following submission. The 
submission of a (non-marketable) limit order is a passive event. Market orders on the other ￿ & ,￿
hand are active. They demand execution certainty and remove standing orders from the 
limit order book. The market must adjust to the change in the level of liquidity. Thus, the 
submission of market order may generate additional volatility on both sides of the order 
book. 
￿
Table 4: ULOs-Market orders mean percentage returns 
   1 min  2 min  5 min  10 min  Day Close 
Entered aggressive orders (808 orders)       
ULOs  0.032  0.039  0.042  0.048  -0.013 
  (11.26*)  (11.68*)  (10.08*)  (8.34*)  (0.39) 
Market Orders  0.036  0.041  0.052  0.046  -0.028 
  (6.57*)  (6.61*)  (6.75*)  (6.89*)  (0.90) 
t-statistic  -0.76  -0.39  -1.08  0.19  0.34 
F-statistic  0.26*  0.28*  0.30*  0.73*  1.10 
 
Table examines the mean price reaction for matched ULOs between 2 January 2003 and 31 
December 2004. Each ULO is paired with a matching market order. The matching and 
preference criterion is outlined in Section 6.11. Values in the parentheses are t-values for the 
null hypothesis that the mean return is zero. The t-statistic at the bottom of each panel tests 
the null hypothesis that the mean price reaction to ULO submission (cancellation) is greater 
than the mean price reaction to market order submission (cancellation). The F-statistic at the 
bottom of each panel tests the null that the variance of returns following ULO submission 
(cancellation) is greater than the variance of returns following market order submission 
(cancellation). For the t-statistics and F-statistics, ** represents significance at the 5% level, 
and * represents significance at the 1% level. All returns are expressed as percentages. All 
values are correct to 2 decimal places. 
 
  Table 5 separates buy and sell orders. At no measured time interval is there any 
statistically significant difference in price reaction between market buy orders, and buy 
ULOs. Examination of the sell orders finds some (weak) evidence of sell market orders 
being more informative than sell ULOs at the 5 minute interval. 
  Table 5 presents the mean price reactions to matching market orders and shows the 
mean price reaction (averaged between 1 and 10 minutes) for market order buys is 0.04%, 
and for market order sells, it is 0.04%.  
  Potential asymmetry of buy and sell orders is examined in Table 6. Significantly 
greater mean price reactions to aggressive entered buy ULOs over sell ULOs is similar to 
the data presented in Table 3. However, there is no evidence of any significant asymmetry 
within market orders between 1 and 10 minutes. 
 ￿ & %￿
Table 5: ULOs-Market orders mean percentage returns- Buy/Sell orders separated 
   1 min  2 min  5 min  10 min  Day Close 
Panel A: Buy-orders (404 orders) 
ULOs  0.038  0.052  0.053  0.068  -0.075 
  (8.94*)  (10.17*)  (8.30*)  (8.01*)  (1.33) 
Market Orders  0.037  0.040  0.045  0.056  -0.101 
  (4.20*)  (4.40*)  (4.60*)  (5.58*)  (1.95) 
t-statistic  0.06  1.08  0.76  0.88  0.33 
F-statistic  0.23*  0.31*  0.44*  0.71*  1.19** 
           
Panel A: Sell-orders (404 orders) 
ULOs  -0.025  -0.025  -0.031  -0.027  -0.049 
  (6.87*)  (6.01*)  (5.79*)  (3.58*)  (1.49) 
Market Orders  -0.035  -0.042  -0.059  -0.036  -0.044 
  (5.35*)  (4.98*)  (4.95*)  (4.08*)  (1.26) 
t-statistic  1.33  1.78  2.12**  0.71  -0.10 
F-statistic  0.31*  0.25*  0.20*  0.76*  0.89 
 
Table  examines  the  mean  price  reaction  for  matched  ULOs  between  2  January  2003  and  31 
December 2004. Each ULO is paired with a matching market order. The matching and preference 
criterion is outlined in Section 6.11. Values in the parentheses are t-values for the null hypothesis 
that the mean return is zero. The t-statistic at the bottom of each panel tests the null hypothesis that 
the mean price reaction to ULO submission (cancellation) is greater than the mean price reaction to 
market order submission (cancellation). The F-statistic at the bottom of each panel tests the null that 
the variance of returns following ULO submission (cancellation) is greater than the variance of 
returns following market order submission (cancellation). For the t-statistics and F-statistics, ** 
represents significance at the 5% level, and * represents significance at the 1% level. All returns are 
expressed as percentages. All values are correct to 2 decimal places. 
 
Table 6: ULOs/Market orders Bid-Ask asymmetry t-statistics  
   1 min  2 min  5 min  10 min  Day Close 
ULOs  2.26**  3.99*  2.66*  3.53*  -1.90 
Market orders  0.19  -0.15  -0.92  1.53  -2.32** 
 
Table presents t-statistics for the null hypothesis that the mean price reaction to buy limit/market 
order submission is greater than the mean price reaction to sell limit/market order submission. ** 
represents significance at the 5% level, and * represents significance at the 1% level. All t-statistics 
are correct to 2 decimal places. 
 
  Table 7 examines the direct impact of limit order submission (cancellation) upon the 
proportional spread
21. Aggressive ULO submissions are found to have a significant impact 
upon the proportional bid-ask spread, at all measured time intervals following submission. 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
21 The proportional spread provides a simple proxy for the change in the level of liquidity.  ￿ & *￿
At 1-minute following ULO submission, there is a significant decrease in the proportional 
spread of 2.4%. The proportional spread continues to decrease by up to 4.6%, 5-minutes 
following ULO submission. Aggressive DLO submissions are also associated with mean 
decreases in the proportional spread. However, these decreases are smaller and are only 
statistically  different  from  zero  at  the  5-minute  interval.  The  reduction  in  the  mean 
proportional spread following aggressive ULO submission is also significantly greater than 
the change in proportional spread following DLO submission at all time intervals.  
  Analogous to the investigation of returns in hypothesis one, the investigation into 
spreads  is  impacted  by  the  change  in  liquidity  caused  by  the  limit  order  submission 
(cancellation) itself. Thus, the measurement of the spread (that includes the same side 
quote) is not free from this potential bias. This finding may imply that ULOs that are 
placed more aggressively within the spread and/or are harder to fill. Nevertheless, this also 
means that ULOs are associated with significantly greater liquidity, as measured by the 
change in proportional spread.
22 Additionally, the mean proportional spread also continues 
to decrease following the order submission.  
  Panel B, Table 7 presents similar results to that in Table 1 and Table 7 shows less 
aggressive  limit  order  submissions  have  no  statistically  significant  impact  upon  the 
proportional spread, at any measured time interval. This is expected given that limit orders 
entered behind the best price have no impact upon the spread, and only add to market 
depth. 
￿ In  contrast  to  evidence  of  significant  short-term  price  impacts  to  limit  order 
cancellations  (seen  in  Table  1),  Panel  C,  Table  7  shows  that  generally  limit  order 
cancellations  have  little  impact  upon  the  change  in  proportional  spread.  Only  DLO 
cancellations are associated with a significant increase in the proportional spread, at the 1 
minute time interval. It was hypothesised that the mean decrease in the proportional spread 
following ULO cancellation is greater than the mean decrease following DLO spread. The 
market appears to react slowly to ULO cancellation. The spread increases at 1 and 2 minute 
intervals,  before  decreasing  gradually  at  the  5  and  10  minute  interval.  However,  the 
decrease in the proportional spread in not significant from zero, or from the change in 
spread following DLO cancellation.  
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
22 This analysis is only relevant for the comparison of ULOs, and matching DLOs. It is not used for the 
comparison of ULOs to market orders. ￿ & 3￿
Table 7: ULO-DLO mean % change in proportional spread   
   1 min  2 min  5 min  10 min 
Panel A: Aggressive Orders Entered (1763 orders) 
ULOs  -2.42  -3.52  -4.63  -4.00 
  (3.29*)  (4.81*)  (6.16*)  (4.84*) 
DLOs  -0.25  -1.01  -1.75  -1.23 
  (0.33)  (1.31)  (2.27**)  (1.55) 
t-statistic  -2.05**  -2.35**  -2.67*  -2.41** 
F-statistic  0.94  0.90*  0.96  1.09** 
         
Panel B: Less Aggressive orders entered (822 orders) 
ULOs  0.14  -0.18  0.01  -0.54 
  (0.16)  (0.18)  (0.01)  (0.47) 
DLOs  0.83  0.94  1.68  0.06 
  (0.84)  (0.85)  (1.46)  (0.05) 
t-statistic  -0.51  -0.74  -1.05  -0.37 
F-statistic  0.88**  0.84*  0.92  1.01 
         
Panel C: Aggressive Orders Cancelled (539 orders) 
ULOs  1.22  0.32  -0.89  -1.83 
  (1.00)  (0.27)  (0.69)  (1.69) 
DLOs  2.95  -0.48  1.12  -0.78 
  (2.91*)  (0.49)  (0.97)  (0.66) 
t-statistic  -1.09  0.52  -1.16  -0.66 
F-statistic  1.46*  1.52*  1.23*  0.73* 
 
Table examines the mean percentage change in proportional spread for matched ULOs between 2 January 
2003 and 31 December 2004. Each ULO is paired with a matching DLO. The matching and preference 
criterion is outlined in Section 6.11. Values in the parentheses are t-values for the null hypothesis that the 
mean change in proportional spread is zero. The t-statistic at the bottom of each panel tests the null 
hypothesis that the mean price reaction to ULO submission (cancellation) is greater than the mean price 
reaction to market order submission (cancellation). The F-statistic at the bottom of each panel tests the 
null that the variance of proportional spread following ULO submission (cancellation) is greater than the 
variance of proportional spread following market order submission (cancellation). For the t-statistics, and 
F-statistics, ** represents significance at the 5% level, and * represents significance at the 1% level. All 
changes in proportional spreads are expressed as percentages. All values are correct to 2 decimal places. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The intraday price reaction between ULOs and matching DLOs/market orders is examined 
and the submission of aggressive limit orders is found to be associated with significant 
(short-term) price reactions. The large price reaction to market orders, relative to limit 
orders, by Aitken et al. (2001) is also likely to have been caused by liquidity. Short-term 
liquidity imbalances driven by large market orders on illiquid stocks may affect both sides ￿ ($ ￿
of the order book and be misinterpreted as information (Hall and Hansch 2004). Despite 
evidence of short-term information content ULO submissions and cancellations provide 
little evidence of additional information content over that of ordinary DLOs, and market 
orders. The submissions of ULOs are also associated with lower volatility of returns when 
compared to that of DLOs and market orders. The proportional spread shows a significant 
decrease following the submission of ULOs. This decrease in the proportional spread is 
significantly  greater  than  for  DLOs.  Our  findings  fail  to  support  all  four  suggested 
hypotheses:  ULOs  are  associated  with  a  level  of  information  content  that  is  not 
significantly  different  to  that  of  DLOs.  Although  no  additional  information  content  is 
uncovered with intraday analysis, the findings are consistent with the view that ULOs are 
used  to  lower  the  option  value  of  limit  orders  and  with  the  intentions  of  ASX  ULO 
regulation. The ASX sacrifices pre-trade transparency for potentially enhanced levels of 
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Table A1: Sample of ASX-listed Stocks 
ASX Code:  Company Name: 
AMC  Amcor Limited 
AMP*  AMP Limited 
ANZ*  Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited 
AWC  Alumina Limited 
BHP*  BHP Billiton Limited 
CBA*  Commonwealth Bank Of Australia 
CML  Coles Myer Limited 
FGL  Foster' s Group Limited 
NAB*  National Australia Bank Limited 
QBE  QBE Insurance Group Limited 
RIO   Rio Tinto Limited 
SGB  St George Bank Limited 
TLS*  Telstra Corporation Limited 
WBC  Westpac Banking Corporation 
WES  Wesfarmers Limited 
WOW  Woolworths Limited 
WPL  Woodside Petroleum Limited 
 
This  table  presents  the  17  ASX-listed  stocks  used  for  analysis  in  Section  1, 
between 2 January 2003 and 31 December 2004. Section 2 analysis is restricted 
to six stocks (indicated by a * in the first column), between 2 January 2003 and 
31 December 2004. Trade and order data is not available for AMP on 1, 2 May 
2003,  and  16  October  2003,  and  for  ANZ  on  24,  27  October  2003  due  to 
suspended trading. News Corporation Inc. and News Corporation Inc. Preference 
shares experience a change of stock code, reverse stock split and movement out 
of  the  ASX/S&P  20  index,  and  are  removed  from  the  sample.  Westfield 
Holdings Ltd. (WSF) changed to Westfield Group (WDC).     
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿